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Human well-being depends in manifold ways on ecosystem services, which are
understood as the various beneﬁts provided by natural or managed ecosystems
(Daily 1997, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Examples include goods
such as food, fuel or ﬁbre; and services such as pollination or the regulation of
local climate, pests, diseases or water runoﬀ from a watershed. In a world of
uncertainty, human well-being depends not only on the mean level at which such
services are being provided, but also on their statistical distribution. Biodiversity
can reduce the variance at which desired ecosystem services are provided. This
means, biodiversity can provide insurance to risk averse users of these systems, e.g.
crop, orchard or livestock farmers, or water utility managers. In this paper, we
analyze how risk-averse ecosystem managers make use of this insurance function
of biodiversity when management measures generate both a private beneﬁt and,
via ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, positive externalities on other
ecosystem users. We study the implications of uncertainty and risk-aversion for
ecosystem management and environmental policy.
The analysis is based on a conceptual ecological-economic model. Ecosystem
services (e.g. pollination of orchards by insects) are random because of exogenous
sources of risk (e.g. winter temperature); their distribution (mean and variance) is
determined by ecosystem quality (biodiversity). Ecosystem quality, in turn, can be
inﬂuenced by management action (e.g. setting aside land for wetlands and hedges as
habitat for insects) that aﬀects ecosystem processes at diﬀerent scales. Ecosystem
users are risk-averse and choose a management action such as to maximize utility
from ecosystem services (e.g. income from orchard farming). Our modelling of
biodiversity and the provision of ecosystem services captures three stylized facts
about ecosystem functioning that emerged from recent theoretical, experimental
and observational research in ecology (which is surveyed in Section 2):
• The mean level of ecosystem services increases with biodiversity.
• The variance of ecosystem services decreases with biodiversity.
2• Local biodiversity is aﬀected by ecosystem processes at diﬀerent hierarchical
scales.
These stylized ecological facts are of economic relevance. Biodiversity increasing
management creates beneﬁts in terms of a higher mean level and a reduced vari-
ance of ecosystem services. In particular, an individual manager’s action aﬀects
biodiversity via ecosystem processes at diﬀerent scales. At a lower scale, beneﬁts
accrue exclusively to him. At a higher scale, his action contributes to increasing
local biodiversity for other users, thereby generating a positive externality. For
example, by setting aside land on his farm as habitat for insects, an individual
farmer increases the local level of biodiversity on his farm and also contributes –
via metapopulation dynamics – to biodiversity on other farms.
Our analysis of endogenous environmental risk and ecosystem management
is inspired by Crocker and Shogren (1999, 2001, 2003) and Shogren and Crocker
(1999), who have developed the idea that environmental risk is endogenous, that is,
economic decision makers bearing environmental risk inﬂuence their risk through
their actions. They have formalized decision making under uncertainty in this
context by conceptualizing ecosystems as lotteries. The role of biodiversity as a
natural insurance has already been studied for the case of a single decision maker
managing a private resource (Baumg¨ artner, forthcoming, Quaas et al., forthcom-
ing). In the ﬁeld of agricultural economics a number of studies have analyzed the
inﬂuence of crop diversity on the mean and variance of agricultural yields (Smale
et al. 1998, Schl¨ apfer et al. 2002, Widawsky and Rozelle 1998, Zhu et al. 2000)
and on the mean and variance of farm income (Di Falco and Perrings 2003, 2005,
Di Falco et al. 2005). It has been conjectured that risk averse farmers use crop
diversity in order to hedge their income risk (Birol et al. 2005a, 2005b, Di Falco
and Perrings 2003).1 However, biodiversity has not only a private insurance func-
tion, but provides public insurance beneﬁts as well. This public-good aspect and
1In this respect, biodiversity plays a similar role for farmers as other risk changing production
factors, such as e.g. nitrogen fertilizer or pesticides (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993, 1994a,
1994b).
3the associated environmental policy issues have not been studied so far.
The conventional wisdom on the use (or provision) of a public good under un-
certainty seems to be that the more uncertainty and the higher the risk aversion
of individual decision makers, the less severe is the problem of overuse (or under-
provision) of the public good (Bramoull´ e and Treich 2005, Sandler and Sterbenz
1990, Sandler et al. 1987). In a sense, this literature suggests that private uncer-
tainty and risk-aversion increase the eﬃciency of the private provision of public
goods. The focus is on the properties of the utility function which are necessary
and suﬃcient for this result. Bramoull´ e and Treich (2005) derive conditions on
the curvature properties of the marginal utility function. Sandler et al. (1987)
discuss in addition the role of separability between utility from the private and the
public good. Both contributions are not interested in the ‘technology’ of public
good provision. They model the production of the public good (or public bad) in
a trivial way, i.e. one unit of money spent on providing the public good equals one
unit of the public good provided. Sandler and Sterbenz (1990) consider the open
access harvesting of a renewable resource, thus taking a more detailed look on how
individual harvesting eﬀorts cause externalities for other users of the ecosystem.
Also, all these contributions study how uncertainty aﬀects individual behaviour in
equilibrium, but do not explicitly address the questions of how severe is the prob-
lem of market failure in welfare terms, or how to solve this problem by suitable
policy measures such as e.g. Pigouvian taxes or subsidies. In this regard, Arons-
son and Blomquist (2003) study the optimal and second-best taxation of a dirty
consumption good which causes a (public bad) pollution problem. They show that
the optimal tax increases with uncertainty.
Against this background, our analysis makes three contributions. First, we
employ a detailed and diﬀerentiated model of ecosystem functioning, which cap-
tures how individual actions translate into private and public beneﬁts. Second,
we explicitly study the extent of market distortion and optimal regulation, and
how those depend on the degree of uncertainty and risk-aversion, by employing a
measure of social welfare. Third, we analyze how the relationship between uncer-
4tainty and the free-rider problem depends on ecosystem properties and processes.
Our analysis thereby yields insights into how the optimal regulation of biodiver-
sity management under uncertainty hinges upon ecosystem characteristics. Of
particular importance in this respect is the insurance function of biodiversity.
We show that with increasing uncertainty and risk-aversion the private ef-
forts to improve ecosystem quality increase, because ecosystem managers, when
choosing a management action under uncertainty, take into account biodiversity’s
insurance value and manage the ecosystem such as to obtain the optimal balance
between high expected yield and insurance. As a consequence, the higher the un-
certainty and the more risk-averse the ecosystem managers are, the higher is the
resulting ecosystem quality. Thus, under uncertainty the ecosystem management
is more conservative, and the resulting ecosystem quality is higher, than it would
be in a world of certainty. Yet, the eﬀect of uncertainty on the free-rider problem
is ambiguous. The extent of the optimal regulatory intervention may decrease or
increase with uncertainty depending on the relative eﬀects of management mea-
sures on biodiversity via the lower, i.e. individual, and the higher, i.e. public,
scale. Additional information about ecosystem functioning is required in order to
assess how uncertainty inﬂuences the welfare loss due to free-riding, which also
may decrease or increase with uncertainty. If biodiversity reduces the variance of
ecosystem services very strongly, the welfare loss decreases with uncertainty. If,
on the other hand, biodiversity hardly reduces the variance of ecosystem services,
the welfare loss increases with uncertainty. In other words, for poorly manageable
ecosystems, the free-rider problem increases with uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the ecological
background on ecosystem functioning and how biodiversity aﬀects the provision
of ecosystem services. In Section 3, we specify an ecological-economic model of an
ecosystem which is managed for the ecosystem services that it provides. The anal-
ysis and results are presented in Section 4, with all proofs and formal derivations
contained in the Appendix. Section 5 concludes.
52 Ecological background: biodiversity and the
provision of ecosystem services
Over the past ﬁfteen years, there has been intensive research in ecology on the role
of biodiversity for ecosystem functioning and the provision of ecosystem services.
Biodiversity has been deﬁned as ‘the variability among living organisms from all
sources ... and the ecological complexes of which they are part’ (CBD 1992), which
encompasses a wide spectrum of biotic scales, from genetic variation within species
to biome distribution on the planet (Gaston 1996, Purvis and Hector 2000, Wilson
1992). Biodiversity can be described in terms of numbers of entities (e.g. geno-
types, species, or ecosystems), the evenness of their distribution, the diﬀerences
in their functional traits, and their interactions. The simplest measure of biodi-
versity at, say, the species level is therefore simply the number of diﬀerent species
(‘species richness’). Much of ecological research has relied on this measure when
quantifying biodiversity, although more encompassing information has also been
employed (Baumg¨ artner 2004).
Research on the role of biodiversity for ecosystem functioning and the provi-
sion of ecosystem services builds on (i) observations of existing ecosystems, (ii)
controlled experiments both in the laboratory and in the ﬁeld (‘pots and plots’)
and (iii) theory and model analysis. While the discussion of results has been, at
times, heated and controversial, there now seems to be a consensus over some of
the basic results from this research (Hooper et al. 2005, Kinzig et al. 2002, Loreau
et al. 2001, 2002).2 Among other insights three ‘stylized facts’ about biodiversity
and ecosystem functioning emerged which are of crucial importance for the issue
studied here:
2The article by Hooper et al. (2005) is a committee report commissioned by the Governing
Board of the Ecological Society of America. Some of its authors have previously been on opposite
sides of the debate. This report surveys the relevant literature, identiﬁes a consensus of current
knowledge as well as open questions, and can be taken to represent the best currently available
ecological knowledge about biodiversity and ecosystem functioning.
61. Biodiversity may enhance the mean level of ecosystem services. In many
instances, an increase in the level of biodiversity monotonically increases the
mean absolute level at which certain ecosystem services are provided. This
eﬀect decreases in magnitude with the level of biodiversity.
2. Biodiversity may reduce the variance of ecosystem services. In many in-
stances, an increase in the level of biodiversity monotonically decreases the
temporal and spatial variability of the level at which these ecosystem services
are provided under changing environmental conditions. This eﬀect decreases
in magnitude with the level of biodiversity.
3. Local biodiversity is aﬀected by ecosystem processes at diﬀerent hierarchical
scales. Ecosystems are hierarchically structured, with processes operating at
diﬀerent spatial and temporal scales and interacting across scales. Species
diversity is typically inﬂuenced diﬀerently by processes at diﬀerent scales.
Accordingly, biodiversity management measures at diﬀerent scales have dif-
ferent impact on local biodiversity.
These three stylized facts are now brieﬂy discussed in turn.3
2.1 Biodiversity may enhance the mean level of ecosystem
services
There are two primary mechanisms through which species or functional diversity
may increase the mean absolute level at which certain ecosystem services are pro-
vided (Figure 1):
(i) Only one or a few species might have a large eﬀect on any given ecosystem
service. Increasing species richness, i.e. the number of diﬀerent species, in-
creases the likelihood that those key species would be present in the system.
3For a more detailed and encompassing discussion of these ﬁndings, and references to the
literature, see Hooper et al. (2005).
7This is known as the ‘sampling eﬀect’ or the ‘selection probability eﬀect’
(Figure 1A).
(ii) Species or functional richness could increase the level of ecosystem services
through complementarity – i.e. species use diﬀerent resources, or the same
resources but at diﬀerent times or diﬀerent points in space – and facilitation
– i.e. positive interactions among species so that e.g. certain species alleviate
harsh environmental conditions or provide a critical resource for other species
(Figure 1B).
Figure 1: Ecological theory has suggested two basic mechanisms of how biodi-
versity could increase the mean absolute level of ecosystem services: sampling or
selection probability eﬀect (A), and complementarity or facilitation (B). Points
show individual treatments, and lines show the average response. (Figures are
taken from Tilman 1997, as compiled by Hooper et al. 2005.)
Complementarity, facilitation and sampling eﬀects will all lead to a saturating av-
erage impact of species richness on the level of some ecosystem service (Figure 1A,
B).
Experiments have conﬁrmed the important role of these two primary mecha-
nisms through which biodiversity may increase the mean absolute level of certain
ecosystem services. In these experiments, the responses to changing diversity are
8strongest at low levels of species richness and generally saturate at 5-10 species. It
has also become evident that complementarity, facilitation and sampling/selection
eﬀects are all relevant and can be observed. They are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, but they may be simultaneously or sequentially at work in one system.
These theoretical and experimental ﬁndings need to be qualiﬁed in a number
of respects:
• The exact response of ecosystem services on changes in biodiversity is de-
termined at least as much by diﬀerences in species composition, i.e. which
species and functional traits are lost and remain behind, as by species rich-
ness, i.e. how many species are lost.
• Patterns of response to experimental manipulation of species richness vary
for diﬀerent ecosystem processes and services, diﬀerent ecosystems, and even
diﬀerent compartments within ecosystems.
• Varying the diversity and composition of an ecological community at more
than one trophic level can lead to more idiosyncratic behavior than varying
diversity of primary producers alone.
• The diﬀerent patterns identiﬁed may or may not reﬂect actual patterns seen
for a particular ecosystem under a particular scenario of species loss or in-
vasion, which will depend not only on the functional traits of the species
involved, but also on the exact pattern of environmental change and the
species traits that determine how species respond to these changes.
2.2 Biodiversity may reduce the variance of ecosystem ser-
vices
Ecological theory, both via simple reasoning and via mathematical models, has
lead to the understanding that a diversity of species with diﬀerent sensitivities to
a suite of environmental conditions should lead to greater stability of ecosystem
properties. The basic idea is that with increasing number of functionally diﬀerent
9species, the probability increases that some of these species can react in a func-
tionally diﬀerentiated manner to external disturbance of the system and changing
environmental conditions. In addition, the probability increases that some species
are functionally redundant, such that one species can take over the role of another
species when the latter goes extinct. This is what ecologists have been calling an
‘insurance eﬀect’ of biodiversity in carrying out ecological processes (e.g. Yachi
and Loreau 1999). With this logic, the number of species or functional traits nec-
essary to maintain ecosystem processes under changing environmental conditions
increases with spatial and temporal scales.
Several mathematical models generally support these hypotheses and highlight
the role of statistical averaging – the so-called ‘portfolio eﬀect’ – for the result:
if species abundances are negatively correlated or vary randomly and indepen-
dently from one another, then overall ecosystem properties are likely to vary less
in more diverse communities than in species-poor communities.4 The strength of
the modeled eﬀects of diversity depends on many parameters, including the de-
gree of correlation among diﬀerent species’ responses, the evenness of distribution
among species’ abundances, and the extent to which the variability in abundances
scales with the mean.
While theory is well developed, controlled experiments are very diﬃcult to
carry out, because one needs to make sure that the eﬀect of species diversity is
not confounded by other variables, such as e.g. soil fertility or disturbance regime.
Nevertheless, considerable evidence exists from experimental studies in a variety
of ecosystems that increasing species diversity can increase the stability of ecosys-
tem processes and services in response to changing environmental conditions and
species loss. As an example, Figure 2 shows experimental results for aboveground
plant biomass production in response to climatic variability in a Minnesota grass-
land (Figure 2A), and net ecosystem CO2 ﬂux in a microbial microcosm (Fig-
ure 2B). However, results of these experiments may be confounded by a variety
of variables other than species richness or diversity, which has raised considerable
4This is similar to the eﬀect of diversifying a portfolio of ﬁnancial assets, e.g. stocks.
10Figure 2: Ecological experiments found that species richness may decrease the vari-
ability of ecosystem services, such as e.g. aboveground plant biomass production
in response to climatic variability in a Minnesota grassland (A), or net ecosystem
CO2 ﬂux in a microbial microcosm (B). (Figures are taken from Tilman 1999 [A]
and McGrady-Steed et al. 1997 [B], as compiled by Hooper et al. 2005.)
controversy over the interpretation of these results. And while species richness
or the Shannon-Wiener-index of species diversity was statistically signiﬁcant in
all these experiments, species composition (where investigated) had an at least
equally strong eﬀect on stability. Also, while the overall stability patterns found
are as predicted from theory, the experiments so far give little insights about the
underlying basic mechanisms.
2.3 Local biodiversity is inﬂuenced by ecosystem processes
at diﬀerent hierarchical scales
Ecosystems are hierarchically structured (Holling 2001, O’Neill 1986), with eco-
logical processes operating at diﬀerent scales and interacting across scales. A
hierarchy of diﬀerent scales is often apparent in the temporal and spatial structure
of ecosystems, but it can be important in other dimensions as well, for instance
with respect to diﬀerent taxonomic levels (Godfray and Lawton 2001). As for
biodiversity, a hierarchical temporal structure is captured in most basic models of
11population dynamics: populations introduced into new areas typically grow expo-
nentially on a fast time scale, before density dependent restrictions limit growth
and determine the long-run carrying capacity (Levin 2000). Very often, there is
a close relationship between hierarchically structured spatial and temporal scales
(Gillson 2004, Leibold et al. 2004). Higher hierarchical levels are characterized
by slower and longer-range processes. Processes on diﬀerent hierarchical levels
typically interact: higher level processes impose constraints on lower levels; and
lower level processes provide the underlying mechanisms from which higher level
properties emerge (Levin 2000).
The (spatial) hierarchical structure of an ecosystem has a particular inﬂuence
on its biodiversity (Tilman 1994), since species diversity is inﬂuenced diﬀerently
by processes at diﬀerent spatial scales. This has been shown both theoretically
(Bond and Chase 2002, Weitz and Rothman 2003) and empirically in experiments
(Cadotte and Tadashi 2005) and ﬁeld work (Chase and Leibold 2002, Cushman
and McGarigal 2002). Local processes at the patch level and regional processes, in
particular the dispersal processes between patches, jointly regulate species diversity
and composition in many systems (e.g., Shurin and Allen 2001).
The hierarchical structure of ecosystems constitutes a particular challenge for
ecosystem management, since it is necessary to adapt the scales at which man-
agement operates to the relevant scales of the ecosystem (Levin 2000, Peterson
et al. 1998). In our model, we capture this by identifying the management ac-
tions aﬀecting processes at the higher hierarchical level with the aggregate action
of ecosystem managers, while the individual management actions inﬂuence the
ecosystem processes at the lower hierarchical level.
3 Ecological-economic model
We consider an ecosystem which is managed for some ecosystem service that it
provides. Due to stochastic ﬂuctuations in environmental conditions the provision
of the ecosystem service is uncertain. Its statistical distribution depends on the
12state of the ecosystem in terms of biodiversity (‘ecosystem quality’), which is inﬂu-
enced by how the system is being managed. As a result, the statistical distribution
of ecosystem service and, hence, of income from ecosystem use depend on ecosys-
tem management. We capture these relationships in a stylized ecological-economic
model as follows.
3.1 Ecosystem management
There are n ecosystem managers, numbered by i = 1,...,n. Each ecosystem
manager can choose a level xi of individual eﬀort to improve ecosystem quality.
The level of ecosystem quality qi is speciﬁc to user i. It increases with user i’s
individual eﬀort xi and the aggregate eﬀort X:
qi = q(xi,X) with qx ≥ 0 , qxx ≤ 0 ,
qX ≥ 0 , qXX ≤ 0 , qxX = qXx ≤ 0 ,
(1)
where
X =
n X
i=1
xi (2)
and subscripts x and X denote partial derivatives with respect to xi and X re-
spectively. We assume that qx > 0 if qX = 0, and that qX > 0 if qx = 0 (otherwise
results are trivial) and that all individuals face the same type of ecosystem, so that
the function q(·,·) has no index i.
Assumption (1) expresses the idea that the level of ecosystem quality relevant
to user i is determined by both the individual management action xi taken by
user i and positive externalities from the joint eﬀort X of all ecosystem managers.
How the function qi depends on xi and X reﬂects the hierarchical structure of the
ecosystem (cf. Section 2.3): it captures how the individual eﬀort xi aﬀects local
ecological processes, how the aggregate eﬀort X aﬀects ecological processes at a
higher scale, and how these processes interact to determine local ecosystem quality.
In the extreme, qx > 0 and qX ≡ 0 corresponds to a situation where only
local ecological processes are relevant and therefore management eﬀort is purely
private with no spill-overs to others. The other extreme, qx ≡ 0 and qX > 0,
13corresponds to a situation where local ecosystem quality is completely determined
by higher-scale ecological processes, such that management eﬀort is a pure public
good.
Given ecosystem quality qi, the ecosystem provides user i with the ecosystem
service at level si which is a random variable that follows a normal distribution.
Its mean, Esi, and variance, var si, depend on ecosystem quality qi:
Esi = µ(qi) and var si = θσ
2(qi) , (3)
where E is the expectancy operator. An increase in the parameter θ > 0 models
a mean-preserving spread of risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). This allows us
to discuss the eﬀects of increased uncertainty in a convenient way. Again, since
all individuals face the same type of ecosystem, the probability distribution of the
ecosystem service is the same for all users who have the same ecosystem quality
q. In accordance with ecological evidence (cf. Sections 2.1 and 2.2), the functions
µ and σ2 are assumed to have the following properties:
µ
0 > 0, µ
00 ≤ 0 and σ
20 < 0, σ
200 ≥ 0, (4)
where the prime denotes a derivative. For each user, the mean level of ecosystem
service provision increases, and its variance decreases, with ecosystem quality q.
Both eﬀects decrease in magnitude with the level of ecosystem quality.
3.2 Income
Improving ecosystem quality carries costs, which are purely private and are de-
scribed by the cost function
c(xi) with c
0 > 0, c
00 ≥ 0 . (5)
Balancing the beneﬁts from ecosystem services and the costs of ecosystem man-
agement, manager i’s net income from ecosystem use is
yi = si − c(xi) , (6)
14where we have assumed that the ecosystem service directly translates into mone-
tary income. Since the ecosystem service si is a random variable, net income yi is a
random variable, too. With the normal distribution of ecosystem service si, where
the mean and variance are given by Esi = µ(q(xi,X)) and var si = σ2 (q(xi,X))
(Equations 3 and 1), the manager’s income yi is normally distributed as well, with
mean Eyi and variance var yi:
Eyi = Esi − c(xi) = µ(q(xi,X)) − c(xi) and (7)
var yi = var si = σ
2(q(xi,X)) . (8)
That is, the mean income is given by the mean ecosystem service minus the costs of
managing ecosystem quality; the variance of income equals the variance of ecosys-
tem service.
3.3 Preferences
All ecosystem managers are assumed to have identical preferences over their uncer-
tain income yi. These are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility function
Ui = Eu(yi) . (9)
The Bernoulli utility function u(yi) is increasing (u0 > 0) and strictly concave
(u00 < 0), i.e. the decision maker is non-satiated and risk-averse.5 In order to
obtain simple closed-form solutions, we assume that manager i’s preferences are
given by the constant absolute risk aversion Bernoulli utility function
u(yi) = −e
−ρyi, (10)
where ρ > 0 is a parameter describing the manager’s Arrow-Pratt measure of
absolute risk aversion (Arrow 1965, Pratt 1964). Since income follows a normal
5While risk-aversion is a natural and standard assumption for farm households (Besley 1995,
Dasgupta 1993: Chapter 8), it appears as an induced property in the behavior of (farm) com-
panies which are fundamentally risk neutral but act as if they were risk averse when facing e.g.
external ﬁnancing constraints or bankruptcy costs (Caillaud et al. 2000, Mayers and Smith 1990).
15distribution with mean Eyi and variance var yi, the von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility function (9) is (see Appendix A.1):
Ui = Eyi −
ρ
2
var yi . (11)
4 Analysis and results
After introducing the notion of insurance value in Section 4.1, the analysis proceeds
in three steps: First, we discuss the laissez-faire equilibrium, which arises if the n
diﬀerent ecosystem managers optimize their management eﬀort taking the actions
of the other managers as given (Section 4.2). Second, we derive the (symmetric)
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation (Section 4.3). Finally, we investigate the extent, in
welfare terms, of the market failure, and analyze policy measures to internalize
the externalities (Section 4.4).
4.1 The insurance value of conservative ecosystem man-
agement
In order to demonstrate how conservative ecosystem management acts as an in-
surance, consider a single ecosystem manager in isolation, i.e. the special case of
n = 1. By choosing an action x, the ecosystem manager chooses a particular in-
come lottery (Crocker and Shogren 2001, Shogren and Crocker 1999), which in our
model is characterized by a normal distribution with mean Ey = µ(q(x,x))−c(x)
and variance var y = σ2(q(x,x)) (Equations 7, 8). These are determined by x and,
therefore, one may speak of ‘the lottery x’. One standard method of valuing the
riskiness of a lottery to a decision maker is to calculate the risk premium R of the
lottery x, which is deﬁned by (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal 1979: 381, Kreps 1990: 84)6
u(Ey − R) = Eu(y) . (12)
6If y ∈ Y with Y as an interval of IR, and if u is continuous and strictly increasing, a risk
premium R uniquely exists for every lottery x (Kreps 1990: 84).
16The risk premium R is the amount of money that leaves the decision maker equally
well of, in terms of utility, between the two situations of (i) receiving for sure the
expected pay-oﬀ from the lottery Ey minus the risk premium R, and (ii) playing
the risky lottery with random pay-oﬀ y.
In general, the idea of an insurance is that it reduces the (income) risk to which
one is exposed. In the extreme, under full insurance one does not have any income
risk at all. For the sake of our analysis, we conceptualize this notion of insurance
by employing the risk premium as a measure of riskiness. A change in the action
x such that, as a result, the risk premium R is reduced, therefore has an insurance
value equal to −dR/dx.
With utility function (11), the risk premium R of a lottery with mean pay-oﬀ
Ey and variance var y is simply given by (see Appendix A.2):
R =
ρ
2
var y , (13)
and the insurance value is given by
−
dR
dx
= −
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(x,x)) [qx(x,x) + qX(x,x)] > 0 . (14)
This insurance value captures (i) the ecosystem manager’s subjective valuation of
risk, measured by the absolute risk-aversion ρ; (ii) the ecosystem’s response, in
terms of reduced variance of ecosystem service provision, to an increased quality,
given by the factor σ20; and (iii) how ecosystem quality improves due to both
individual and the aggregate management eﬀorts (the ‘technology’ of ecosystem
management), given by the factor qx + qX. Note that (i) captures a subjective
aspect, while (ii) and (iii) capture objective aspects of the insurance value.
4.2 Laissez-faire equilibrium
As laissez-faire equilibrium, we consider the allocation which results as Nash-
equilibrium without regulating intervention. Each ecosystem manager’s decision
problem is to maximize his expected utility, taking the actions of all other ecosys-
17tem managers as given. Formally, manager i’s decision problem is
max
xi
µ(q(xi,X)) − c(xi) −
ρ
2
θσ
2(q(xi,X)) , (15)
where X = x1 + ... + xn and all xj for j 6= i are treated as given. We assume
(throughout the remainder of this paper) that an interior solution exists.7
Lemma 1
The laissez-faire equilibrium has the following properties: (i) it is unique, (ii) all
ecosystem managers choose the same level of ecosystem management, xi = x? for
all i = 1,...,n, and (iii) it is characterized by the condition
µ
0(q(x
?,nx
?)) [qx(x
?,nx
?) + qX(x
?,nx
?)]
−
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(x
?,nx
?)) [qx(x
?,nx
?) + qX(x
?,nx
?)] = c
0(x
?) . (16)
Proof: see Appendix A.3.
While the right hand side of Condition (16) captures the marginal costs of the
eﬀort to improve ecosystem quality, the left hand side contains its marginal bene-
ﬁts. They comprise two additive components: the marginal gain in the mean level
of ecosystem service and the insurance value of improving ecosystem quality, i.e.
the marginal reduction of the manager’s risk-premium due to a marginal increase
in his individual management eﬀort (cf. Section 4.1). Hence, the insurance value
is a value component in addition to the value arguments which hold in a world of
certainty. It leads to choosing a higher level of management eﬀort than without
taking the insurance value into account. How the equilibrium level of ecosystem
management eﬀort depends on the degree of uncertainty and on the managers’ risk
aversion mainly depends on the properties of the insurance value.
7Ecosystem properties (1) and (4) and the cost function (5) do not exclude corner solutions.
For instance, for very high marginal costs and low marginal beneﬁts of management eﬀort, the
Nash equilibrium may be not to make any eﬀort at all. On the other hand, for low marginal
costs, the equilibrium could be to make the maximum possible eﬀort, because ecosystem quality
has the double beneﬁt of increasing the mean and reducing the variance of ecosystem service
provision.
18Proposition 1
1. The equilibrium levels x? of ecosystem management eﬀort and q? of ecosys-
tem quality increase with uncertainty:
dx?
dθ
> 0 and
dq?
dθ
> 0 . (17)
2. The equilibrium levels x? of ecosystem management eﬀort and q? of ecosys-
tem quality increase with the ecosystem managers’ degree ρ of risk aversion:
dx?
dρ
> 0 and
dq?
dρ
> 0 . (18)
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. Since the individuals are risk-
averse, the risk-premium increases if either the degree of risk-aversion or the un-
certainty as such increase. As a consequence, the insurance value of improving
ecosystem quality increases. The resulting higher marginal utility leads to a higher
equilibrium level of management eﬀort x? and to improved ecosystem quality q?.
This corresponds to a result known from the literature on the use (or provision)
of a public good under uncertainty (Bramoull´ e and Treich 2005: Propositions 4
and 8, Sandler et al. 1987, Sandler and Sterbenz 1990), according to which the
condition u000(y) ≥ 0 is necessary for individual contributions to a public good to
increase with uncertainty or risk-aversion. The utility function (10) employed here
satisﬁes this condition. Our approach, being based on the concept of insurance
value, points to additional conditions for the result. Besides the curvature of the
marginal utility function (ρ), the insurance value (cf. Section 4.1) depends on the
properties of the ecosystem (σ20) and the ‘technology’ of ecosystem management
(qx, qX). This suggests that there exist ecosystems or ecosystem management
technologies for which this result does not hold.8
8For example, if qx < 0 and qX > 0 with qx+qX < 0, that is, if individual management eﬀort
causes a net private damage besides a public beneﬁt, the Inequalities (17) and (18) are reversed.
194.3 Eﬃcient allocation
The next step is to derive the eﬃcient allocation. Since we are interested in com-
paring the eﬃcient allocation to the laissez-faire equilibrium, we will concentrate
on the symmetric Pareto-optimum in which all ecosystem managers make the same
eﬀort.9 To derive this allocation we deﬁne social welfare as the sum of the utilities
of all n ecosystem managers:
W =
n X
i=1
h
Eyi −
ρ
2
var yi
i
. (19)
The eﬃcient allocation is derived by choosing the individual levels of management
eﬀort, such that social welfare (19) is maximized subject to the constraints (7) and
(8),
max
x1,...,xn
n X
i=1
h
µ
¡
q
¡
xi,X
¢¢
−
ρ
2
θσ
2¡
q
¡
xi,X
¢¢
− c(xi)
i
. (20)
The solution to this problem is characterized as follows.
Lemma 2
The eﬃcient allocation has the following properties: (i) it is unique, (ii) all ecosys-
tem managers make the same management eﬀort ˆ x, and (iii) it is characterized by
the condition
µ
0(q(ˆ x,n ˆ x)) [qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x) + nqX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)]
−
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(ˆ x,n ˆ x)) [qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x) + nqX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)] = c
0(ˆ x) . (21)
Proof: see Appendix A.6.
Like in the laissez-faire equilibrium, the insurance value of improving ecosystem
quality plays an important role. The eﬃcient insurance value in Condition (21)
consists of similar components as the insurance value considered by the individual
ecosystem managers in equilibrium (Condition 16), but the contribution of the
aggregate eﬀort on ecosystem quality is augmented by a factor n. Because the
positive externalities of individual management eﬀort on the other ecosystem users’
9Conditions for a general Pareto-optimum are derived in Appendix A.5.
20risk premium are taken into account, the eﬃcient insurance value is greater than
the equilibrium insurance value. Similarly, the marginal beneﬁts with respect to
the mean level of ecosystem service provision are higher in the eﬃcient allocation.
This implies that the eﬃcient level ˆ x of individual management eﬀort is greater
than the equilibrium level x?, and the eﬃcient level ˆ q of ecosystem quality is greater
than the equilibrium level q?. The eﬃcient allocation has the following properties.
Proposition 2
1. The eﬃcient levels ˆ x of ecosystem management eﬀort and ˆ q of ecosystem
quality increase with uncertainty:
dˆ x
dθ
> 0 and
dˆ q
dθ
> 0 . (22)
2. The eﬃcient levels ˆ x of ecosystem management eﬀort and ˆ q of ecosystem
quality increase with the ecosystem managers’ degree ρ of risk aversion:
dˆ x
dρ
> 0 and
dˆ q
dρ
> 0 . (23)
Proof: see Appendix A.7.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. An increase in the uncertainty
or in the degree of the ecosystem managers’ risk-aversion increases the eﬃcient
insurance value of ecosystem management eﬀort. Hence, the marginal beneﬁts of
management eﬀort increase, leading to a higher eﬃcient level ˆ x of eﬀort. As a
consequence, ecosystem quality ˆ q increases. The eﬀects go in the same direction
as in the laissez-faire equilibrium. However, they diﬀer in their quantitative extent
because the positive externalities are taken into account.
4.4 Environmental policy
Due to the external eﬀects of individual ecosystem management eﬀort, the laissez-
faire equilibrium is not eﬃcient. In equilibrium, ecosystem managers will spend
too little eﬀort to improve ecosystem quality, because they do not take into consid-
eration the positive externality on other ecosystem users. In order to implement
21the eﬃcient allocation as an equilibrium, a regulator could impose a Pigouvian
subsidy on individual management eﬀort. Denoting the subsidy per unit xi with
τ, the optimization problem of ecosystem manager i then reads
max
xi
µ(q(xi,X)) − c(xi) −
ρ
2
θσ
2 (q(xi,X)) + τ xi . (24)
Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for the eﬃcient allocation (Equation 21) and
for the regulated equilibrium (i.e. the ﬁrst order condition of maximizing (24) with
respect to xi), we obtain the optimal subsidy ˆ τ.
Lemma 3
The eﬃcient allocation is implemented as an equilibrium, if a subsidy ˆ τ on indi-
vidual ecosystem management eﬀort is set with
ˆ τ = (n − 1)qX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
h
µ
0(q(ˆ x,n ˆ x)) −
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(ˆ x,n ˆ x))
i
. (25)
Clearly, the optimal subsidy increases with qX(ˆ x,n ˆ x), i.e. it is higher, the higher
is the marginal beneﬁt of aggregate eﬀort in terms of ecosystem quality improve-
ment. There are two contributions to the optimal subsidy rate, which are captured
by the two terms in brackets. In the case of risk-neutrality, ρ = 0, only the ﬁrst
term in brackets remains. Then, the optimal subsidy is (n − 1)qX µ0, that is, it
just internalizes the positive externality that an increase in individual manage-
ment eﬀort has on the expected payoﬀ of the n − 1 other ecosystem managers.
For ρ > 0, the second term in brackets captures the positive externality of an
individual ecosystem manager’s contribution to ecosystem quality which is due to
the insurance value that the higher ecosystem quality has for the n−1 remaining
ecosystem managers.
The optimal subsidy ˆ τ can be interpreted as the extent of the regulation nec-
essary in order to solve the public good problem. It has become clear from the
discussion so far that the public good problem depends on the degree of uncer-
tainty and of the ecosystem managers’ risk-aversion. The questions are whether
more or less regulation is required if (i) the uncertainty of ecosystem services or
(ii) the degree of risk-aversion increase.
22Proposition 3
1. The optimal subsidy decreases/is unchanged/increases with uncertainty, i.e.
dˆ τ
dθ
< = >
0 , (26)
2. and the optimal subsidy decreases/is unchanged/increases with the degree ρ
of risk-aversion, i.e.
dˆ τ
dρ
< = >
0 , (27)
if
−
ˆ xφ0(ˆ x)
φ(ˆ x)
qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
nqX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
> = <
ˆ xc00(ˆ x)
c0(ˆ x)
, (28)
where
φ(x) ≡
qx(x,nx)
qx(x,nx) + nqX(x,nx)
. (29)
Proof: see Appendix A.8.
Although both increased uncertainty and increased risk-aversion have an un-
ambiguously positive eﬀect on the individual level of management eﬀort to improve
ecosystem quality (Proposition 1), the eﬀect on the optimal regulation can go ei-
ther way, depending on the ‘technology’ and the costs of ecosystem management
as speciﬁed by Condition (28). On the left hand side of Condition (28), the expres-
sion φ(x) is the share of marginal ecosystem quality improvement on the individual
scale out of total marginal ecosystem quality improvement including the positive
externalities on the aggregate scale. It is, in short, the individual share of marginal
quality improvement. With this, the ﬁrst factor on the left hand side of Condi-
tion (28) is the elasticity of the individual share of marginal quality improvement
with respect to management eﬀort. The second factor simply is the marginal rate
of substitution between management eﬀorts on the individual and on the aggre-
gate scale. On the right hand side of Condition (28) is the elasticity of marginal
costs. Hence, the Pigouvian subsidy decreases/is unchanged/increases with un-
certainty (or risk-aversion), if the elasticity of the individual share of marginal
quality improvement times the marginal rate of substitution between eﬀort on the
23individual and aggregate scale is greater than/equal to/less than the elasticity of
marginal costs. In particular, in the case of constant marginal costs, the Pigouvian
subsidy decreases with uncertainty, if and only if the elasticity of the individual
share of marginal quality improvement is positive. This does not need to be the
case. Overall, whether the Pigouvian subsidy increases or decreases with uncer-
tainty depends on how ecosystem processes operating at diﬀerent scales inﬂuence
ecosystem quality; it does not depend on how exactly ecosystem service provision
is inﬂuenced by ecosystem quality.
Although the Pigouvian subsidy is an appropriate measure of the extent of
regulation necessary to reach the eﬃcient allocation in a decentralized economy,
a diﬀerent measure is required in order to determine the welfare loss due to the
external eﬀects. This welfare loss is the diﬀerence in welfare between the eﬃcient
allocation and the laissez-faire allocation. Employing the welfare function (19), it
is given by
ˆ W − W
? = n
h
µ(q (ˆ x,n ˆ x)) −
ρ
2
θσ
2 (q (ˆ x,n ˆ x)) − c(ˆ x)
i
− n
h
µ(q (x
?,nx
?)) −
ρ
2
θσ
2 (q (x
?,nx
?)) − c(x
?)
i
> 0 . (30)
Proposition 4
The welfare loss due to free-riding decreases/is unchanged/increases with uncer-
tainty, i.e.
d
dθ
³
ˆ W − W
?
´
< = >
0 (31)
if
ρ
2
£
σ
2 (q (x
?,nx
?)) − σ
2 (q (ˆ x,n ˆ x))
¤
− τ
? dx?
dθ
< = >
0 , (32)
where
τ
? = (n − 1)qX (x
?,nx
?)
h
µ
0 (q (x
?,nx
?)) −
ρ
2
θσ
20 (q (x
?,nx
?))
i
> 0 . (33)
Proof: This is proved by diﬀerentiating Equation (30) with respect to θ, using
the envelope theorem, d ˆ W/dθ = ∂ ˆ W/∂θ, and the equilibrium condition (16). 2
Whether the welfare loss due to free-riding decreases or increases with uncer-
tainty depends on the relative magnitude of two eﬀects: on the one hand, the
24diﬀerence between the variance of ecosystem service provision in the laissez-faire
equilibrium and in the optimum is spread with increasing uncertainty. This eﬀect
worsens the market failure. On the other hand, uncertainty increases individual
management eﬀort in equilibrium (Proposition 1), which decreases the extent of
market failure.10 The second eﬀect is weighted by a factor of τ?, which is the
external marginal beneﬁt of an ecosystem manager’s individual eﬀort for all n−1
other ecosystem managers in equilibrium. This positive externality determines
how valuable it is, in welfare terms, that individual ecosystem management eﬀort
increases with uncertainty.
The net eﬀect of increased uncertainty on the welfare loss due to the externality
is ambiguous. In the following, we will demonstrate that whether the welfare loss
decreases or increases depends on the ecosystem’s properties. For this purpose, we
consider an example which is simple enough to enable a closed-form solution. Let
q(x,X) = x
1−γ X
γ with 0 < γ < 1 . (34)
This speciﬁcation is analytically very convenient, and it corresponds to the well
established species-area-relationship at each of the two hierarchical levels, i.e. q is
a power function of both x and X. We further assume constant marginal costs
of management eﬀort, c(x) = c · x, which corresponds to a constant price of land
set aside for biodiversity protection. In order to focus on the insurance eﬀect we
disregard that improved ecosystem quality increases the mean level of ecosystem
services, i.e. µ(q) = µ = constant. Finally, the variance of ecosystem services
depends on ecosystem quality as follows11
σ
2(q) = (δ − η q)
1
η with η < 1 and δ > 0 . (35)
This speciﬁcation includes (for diﬀerent η) large variety of functions satisfying
Conditions (4). For η > 0, it is possible to obtain the ecosystem service at zero
10Sandler et al. (1987) and Bramoull´ e and Treich (2005) study exclusively this latter eﬀect
and, therefore, conclude that increasing risk reduces the public-good problem.
11For η > 0, we deﬁne σ2(q) by (35) for all q ≤ δ/η and by σ2(q) ≡ 0 for all q > δ/η. In the
case η = 0, the speciﬁcation (35) becomes σ2(q) = exp(−q/δ).
25variance, provided ecosystem quality is high enough. This is not possible for η < 0.
Whether the welfare losses due to the public good problem decreases, is unchanged,
or increases with uncertainty depends on the type of ecosystem, as speciﬁed by
the parameter η.
Proposition 5
Given the speciﬁcations of the example, with increasing uncertainty the welfare
loss due to free-riding decreases if η > 0, is not aﬀected if η = 0, and increases if
η < 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.9.
The case η > 0 corresponds to an ecosystem which is very eﬀectively manage-
able: an increase of ecosystem quality strongly reduces the uncertainty of ecosys-
tem service provision and can, eventually, completely remove the uncertainty. In
this case (and given the other speciﬁcations of the example), increasing uncertainty
reduces the welfare loss due to free-riding. However, even if η > 0 uncertainty does
not necessarily increase welfare: in the eﬃcient allocation, uncertainty unambigu-
ously reduces welfare of risk-averse individuals; in the laissez-faire equilibrium,
welfare can, in principle, increase with uncertainty. In our example, this is the
case if η > 1 − γ n−1
n (cf. Appendix A.9), which is a stronger assumption than
η > 0.
In the case η = 0, uncertainty plays no role for the extent of welfare loss.
For η < 0, the eﬀect that the diﬀerence in variance between the eﬃcient allo-
cation and the laissez-faire equilibrium increases with uncertainty outweighs the
welfare-increasing eﬀect of increased individual management eﬀort. In that case,
uncertainty increases the welfare loss due to free-riding.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed how risk-averse ecosystem users manage an ecosystem for its
services. The ecosystem model captures three stylized facts, as identiﬁed in the
26ecological literature: (i) the mean level of ecosystem services increases with bio-
diversity; (ii) the variance of ecosystem services decreases with biodiversity; (iii)
biodiversity is inﬂuenced by ecosystem processes operating at diﬀerent hierarchical
scales. We have considered two such scales: individual management action aﬀects
processes at the lower scale, while aggregate action aﬀects processes at the higher
scale. Thus, an individual management action has not only a private beneﬁt, but
also a positive external eﬀect on other ecosystem users.
We have demonstrated that conservative biodiversity management has an in-
surance value, which depends on the ecosystem managers’ risk-aversion and on
ecosystem properties. Because ecosystem managers, when choosing a manage-
ment action under uncertainty, take into account the ecosystem’s insurance value,
the level of individual eﬀort to improve ecosystem quality increases with increas-
ing uncertainty and risk-aversion. As a consequece, higher uncertainty and higher
risk-aversion lead to a higher level of biodiversity. Thus, under uncertainty the
ecosystem management is more conservative, and the resulting level of biodiver-
sity is higher, than it would be in a world of certainty.
Due to the external eﬀect of individual management eﬀort, the laissez-faire
equilibrium is not eﬃcient. In order to study how the public good-problem is
aﬀected by uncertainty, we have analyzed how (i) the extent of regulation necessary
to implement the eﬃcient allocation and (ii) the welfare loss due to free-riding
depend on the degree of uncertainty.
How the Pigouvian subsidy, as a measure of the extent of eﬃcient regulation, is
aﬀected by uncertainty depends on how management eﬀort at the individual scale
and at the aggregate scale contribute to ecosystem quality. For constant marginal
costs of management eﬀort, the Pigouvian subsidy decreases with uncertainty if
the elasticity of the individual share of marginal quality improvement is positive,
and increases otherwise. Hence, the extent of the regulatory intervention necessary
to implement the eﬃcient allocation depends on the hierarchichal structure of how
ecosystem management aﬀects biodiversity, but not on how exactly biodiversity
inﬂuences the provision of ecosystem services. In contrast, the latter crucially de-
27termines whether the welfare loss due to free-riding decreases or increases with
uncertainty: if management measures translate eﬀectively into reduced variance
of ecosystem service provision, the welfare loss tends to decrease with uncertainty;
if, on the other hand, the ecosystem is poorly manageable and variance can only
be reduced partially, higher uncertainty tends to increase welfare losses due to
free-riding. These results highlight that ecosystem properties determine how ef-
ﬁcient environmental policy and welfare losses change with uncertainty. This is
new to the literature on the provision of public goods under uncertainty, which
generally focuses on consumer preferences and disregards the nature of ecosystem
functioning.
Our analysis enables a number of extensions. Besides the insurance function of
conservative ecosystem management, one could account for socio-economic insti-
tutions for risk-management, for example, commercial insurance markets (Quaas
and Baumg¨ artner 2005). Also, other sources of risk (e.g. price risk, institutional
or political risk) and other risk characteristics (e.g. thresholds or skewed distribu-
tions) could have interesting eﬀects. An extension of the analysis to capture the
dynamics of environmental quality, as well as savings and credits as mechanisms to
cope with risk, could provide further insights. Finally, the conceptual ecological-
economic framework developed here, in which both environmental management
and ecosystem properties determine the stochasticity of ecosystem service provi-
sion, can be applied to other environmental problems, such as river ﬂoods, climate
change, or the spread of genetically modiﬁed organisms.
Appendix
A.1 Expected utility function (11)
With
f(y) =
1
√
2πvar y
e
−
(y−Ey)2
2var y (A.1)
28as the probability density function of the normal distribution of income y with
mean Ey and variance var y, the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility from
the Bernoulli utility function (10) is
˜ U = Eu(y) = −
Z
e
−ρyf(y)dy = −e
−ρ[Ey−
ρ
2 var y] . (A.2)
Using a simple monotonic transformation of ˜ U, one obtains the expected utility
function U (Equation 11).
A.2 Risk premium (13)
The risk premium R has been deﬁned in Equation (12) as
u(Ey − R) = Eu(y) . (A.3)
With the Bernoulli utility function (10) the left hand side of this equation is given
by
u(Ey − R) = −e
−ρ[Ey−R] , (A.4)
and the right hand side is given by Equation (A.2). Hence, we have
−e
−ρ[Ey−R] = −e
−ρ[Ey−
ρ
2 var y] . (A.5)
Rearranging yields the result stated in Equation (13).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
The ﬁrst order condition of Problem (15) is
h
µ
0(q(xi,X)) −
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(xi,X))
i
[qx(xi,X) + qX(xi,X)] = c
0(xi) . (A.6)
We denote by ˜ X the aggregate eﬀort of all ecosystem managers except for man-
ager i, i.e. ˜ X = X − xi. Hence, we can write
h
µ
0(q(xi,xi + ˜ X)) −
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(xi,xi + ˜ X))
i h
qx(xi,xi + ˜ X) + qX(xi,xi + ˜ X)
i
= c
0(xi) . (A.7)
29We prove the lemma in three steps: (i) we prove that a solution x? to (16) is
unique, (ii) we prove that xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n is a Nash-equilibrium. This
is done by showing that xi = x? solves (A.7), if ˜ X = (n−1)x?. And (iii) we prove
that no asymmetric Nash-equilibrium exists.
Ad (i). A solution x? of (16) is unique, because, by assumption (5), the right
hand side c0(x?) is increasing with x?, while the left hand side is decreasing with x?;
d
dx?
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
[qx + qX]
=
h
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
200i
[qx + qX] [qx + nqX]
+
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
[qxx + (n + 1)qxX + nqXX] ≤ 0 , (A.8)
where we omitted arguments for the sake of a clearer exposition. The sign of this
expression is negative by assumptions (1) and (4).
Ad (ii). To show that the symmetric allocation xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n
is a Nash equilibrium, we assume ˜ X = (n − 1)x? is given for manager i. In this
case, the optimal eﬀort for manager i is x?, because xi = x? solves Condition (16)
uniquely. By symmetry, xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n.
Ad (iii). Consider the two cases (i) ˜ X > (n − 1)x? and (ii) ˜ X < (n − 1)x?. In
case (i), the optimal eﬀort for manager i is xi < x?. To prove this, we diﬀerentiate
Condition (A.7) w.r.t. ˜ X, which yields
dxi
d ˜ X
= −
£
µ00 −
ρ
2 θσ200¤
[qx + qX] qX +
£
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20¤
[qxX + qXX]
£
µ00 −
ρ
2 θσ200¤
[qx + qX]
2 +
£
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20¤
[qxx + 2qxX + qXX] − c00,
(A.9)
which is negative by assumptions (1) and (4). Since xi = x? for ˜ X = (n − 1)x?,
xi < x? for ˜ X > (n−1)x?. Due to the symmetry, this contradicts the assumption
˜ X > (n − 1)x?, since all ecosystem managers would choose xi < x?. Hence, there
is no equilibrium where ˜ X > (n−1)x?. With a similar argument, we can rule out
case (ii). Hence, xi = x? for all i = 1,...,n is the unique equilibrium.
30A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Ad 1. Diﬀerentiating Condition (16) with respect to θ yields:
·h
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
200i
[qx + qX] [qx + nqX]
+
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
[qxx + (n + 1)qxX + nqXX] − c
00
¸
dx?
dθ
=
ρσ20
2
[qx + qX] . (A.10)
Rearranging, and using the equilibrium condition (16), we have
dx?
dθ
= −
1
θ
"
µ00 −
ρ
2 θσ200
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20 [qx + nqX] +
qxx + (n + 1)qxX + nqXX
qx + qX
−
c00
c0
#−1
.
(A.11)
Because the term in brackets is negative (by Assumptions (1), (4) and (5)), we
conclude dx?/dθ > 0. dq?/dθ > 0 follows, because
dq(x?,nx?)
dx? = qx + nqX > 0 . (A.12)
Ad 2. Diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to ρ yields (omitting arguments):
·h
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
200i
[qx + qX] [qx + nqX]
+
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
[qxx + (n + 1)qxX + nqXX] − c
00
¸
dx?
dρ
=
θσ20
2
[qx + qX] . (A.13)
The same arguments as in Part 1 of the proof lead to the conclusion dx?/dρ > 0
and dq?/dρ > 0.
A.5 Pareto-eﬃcient allocations
We consider the social planner’s problem
max
x1,...,xn
Eu(y1) s.t. (1), (2), (4), (7), (8), and Eu(yi) ≥ Ui ∀ i 6= 1.
31The Lagrangian for this problem reads
L = µ(q(x1,X)) − c(x1) −
ρ
2
θσ
2(q(x1,X)) +
n X
k=2
λi [Eu(yi) − Ui]
=
n X
i=1
λi
h
µ(q(xi,X)) − c(xi) −
ρ
2
θσ
2(q(xi,X)) − Ui
i
+ U1,
where λ1 = 1. The ﬁrst order conditions of this problem read for all i ∈ {1,...,n}:
λi
h
µ
0(q(ˆ xi, ˆ X)) − c
0(ˆ xi) −
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(ˆ xi, ˆ X))
i
qx(ˆ xi ˆ X)
! = −
n X
k=1
λk
h
µ
0(q(ˆ xk, ˆ X)) −
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(ˆ xk, ˆ X))
i
qX(ˆ xk, ˆ X) . (A.14)
Dividing the i-th equation by the ﬁrst one yields:
λi =
µ0(q(ˆ x1, ˆ X))qx(ˆ x1, ˆ X) − c0(ˆ x1) −
ρ
2 θσ20(q(ˆ x1, ˆ X))qx(ˆ x1, ˆ X)
µ0(q(ˆ xi, ˆ X))qx(ˆ xi, ˆ X) − c0(ˆ xi) −
ρ
2 θσ20(q(ˆ xi, ˆ X))qx(ˆ xi, ˆ X)
.
Using this in Equation (A.14) leads to
1 = −
n X
k=1
µ0(q(ˆ xk, ˆ X)) −
ρ
2 θσ20(q(ˆ xk, ˆ X))
µ0(q(ˆ xi, ˆ X))qx(ˆ xi, ˆ X) − c0(ˆ xi) −
ρ
2 θσ20(q(ˆ xi, ˆ X))qx(ˆ xi, ˆ X)
qX(ˆ xk ˆ X) .
(A.15)
In the symmetric case, i.e. xi = ˆ x for all i ∈ {1,...,n}, it is c0(x1) = c0(xi), and
Equation (A.15) simpliﬁes to
−c
0(ˆ x)+[qx(ˆ x,n ˆ x) + nqX(ˆ x,n ˆ x)]
h
µ
0(q(ˆ x,n ˆ x)) −
ρ
2
θσ
20(q(ˆ x,n ˆ x))
i
= 0 . (A.16)
A.6 Proof of Lemma 2
First, we show that it is optimal to choose the same management for all n ecosystem
managers, i.e. that
1
n
n X
i=1
µ
¡
q
¡
xi,X
¢¢
−
ρ
2
θσ
2¡
q
¡
xi,X
¢¢
− c(xi)
≤ µ
¡
q
¡X
n
,X
¢¢
−
ρ
2
θσ
2¡
q
¡X
n
,X
¢¢
− c
¡X
n
¢
, (A.17)
where X =
Pn
j=1 xj. This is true by Jensen’s inequality, because the welfare
function is concave in xi for any given X.12 Hence, we have to ﬁnd the level x of
12The idea for this proof is taken from Bramoull´ e and Treich (2005).
32eﬀort to improve ecosystem quality, which maximizes
n
h
µ(q(x,nx)) −
ρ
2
θσ
2(q(x,nx)) − c(x)
i
. (A.18)
This is a strictly concave function of x, since
d2
dx2
h
n
h
µ(q(x,nx)) −
ρ
2
θσ
2(q(x,nx)) − c(x)
ii
=
h
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
200i
[qx + nqX]
2+
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i £
qxx + 2nqxX + n
2 qXX
¤
−c
00 < 0 .
(A.19)
Hence, if an interior solution exists, it is uniquely determined by the ﬁrst order
condition
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
[qx + nqX] = c
0 . (A.20)
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Ad 1. Diﬀerentiating Condition (21) with respect to θ yields:
hh
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
200i
[qx + nqX]
2 +
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i £
qxx + 2nqxX + n
2 qXX
¤
− c
00
i dˆ x
dθ
=
ρσ20
2
[qx + nqX] . (A.21)
Because the term in brackets on the left hand side of this equation is negative and
because the right hand side of the equation is negative (both by assumptions (1),
(4) and (5)), we conclude dˆ x/dθ > 0. dˆ q/dθ > 0 follows, because
dq(ˆ x,n ˆ x)
dˆ x
= qx + nqX > 0 . (A.22)
Ad 2. Diﬀerentiating (21) with respect to ρ yields (omitting arguments):
hh
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
200i
[qx + nqX]
2 +
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i £
qxx + 2nqxX + n
2 qXX
¤
− c
00
i dˆ x
dρ
=
θσ20
2
[qx + nqX] . (A.23)
The same arguments as in Part 1 of the proof lead to the conclusion dˆ x/dρ > 0
and dˆ q/dρ > 0.
33A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Ad 1. In order to derive the comparative statics of ˆ τ with respect to θ, we diﬀer-
entiate (25) with respect to θ. This yields (omitting arguments)
dˆ τ
dθ
= (n − 1)
·h
[qxX + nqXX]
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
(A.24)
+ qX
h
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
2000i
[qx + nqX]
idˆ x
dρ
− qX
ρ
2
σ
20
¸
(A.25)
From Equation (A.23), we have
dˆ x
dθ
=
ρ
2 σ20 [qx + nqX]
£
µ00 −
ρ
2 θσ200¤
[qx + nqX]
2 +
£
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20¤
[qxx + 2nqxX + n2 qXX] − c00
(A.26)
Using this in (A.25) and simplifying yields
dˆ τ
dθ
=
(n − 1)
ρ
2 σ20 ££
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20¤
[−qX qxx − nqxX qX + nqx qXX + qx qxX] + qX c00¤
£
µ00 −
ρ
2 θσ200¤
[qx + nqX]
2 +
£
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20¤
[qxx + 2nqxX + n2 qXX] − c00 .
(A.27)
Since the denominator of this expression is negative and the ﬁrst two factors of
the numerator together are negative, too, the change of ˆ τ following an increase in
θ has the same sign as
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
[−qX qxx − nqxX qX + nqx qXX + qx qxX] + qX c
00 . (A.28)
Rearranging, this expression has the same sign as
−
"
ˆ xqxx
qx
+
ˆ X qxX
qx
−
ˆ xqxX
qX
−
ˆ X qXX
qX
# h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
qx + ˆ xc
00 , (A.29)
which is equal to, using the eﬃciency condition (21),
−
"
− ˆ X qXX − ˆ xqXx
qX
−
−ˆ xqxx − ˆ X qxX
qx
#
c0 qx
qx + nqX
+ ˆ xc
00 . (A.30)
Using the abbreviation (29) and rearranging leads to Condition (28).
34Ad 2. Diﬀerentiating the optimal subsidy (25) with respect to ρ leads to
dˆ τ
dρ
= (n − 1)
·h
[qxX + nqXX]
h
µ
0 −
ρ
2
θσ
20i
(A.31)
+ qX
h
µ
00 −
ρ
2
θσ
2000i
[qx + nqX]
idˆ x
dθ
− qX
θ
2
σ
20
¸
(A.32)
Using (A.21) and rearranging yields
dˆ τ
dθ
=
(n − 1) θ
2 σ20 ££
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20¤
[−qX qxx − nqxX qX + nqx qXX + qx qxX] + qX c00¤
£
µ00 −
ρ
2 θσ200¤
[qx + nqX]
2 +
£
µ0 −
ρ
2 θσ20¤
[qxx + 2nqxX + n2 qXX] − c00 ,
(A.33)
which is negative, if and only if Condition (28) is fulﬁlled.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
With the speciﬁcations (34), c(x) = c · x, and µ(q) = µ, we have (using A.11)
dx?
dθ
=
1
θ
·
1 − η
δ − η q (x?,nx?)
q (x?,nx?)
x?
¸−1
. (A.34)
and
τ
? = (n − 1)
γ
n
q (x?,nx?)
x?
ρ
2
θ
σ2 (q (x?,nx?))
δ − η q (x?,nx?)
. (A.35)
Thus,
τ
? dx?
dθ
=
ρ
2
σ
2 (q (x
?,nx
?)) γ
n − 1
n
1
1 − η
. (A.36)
Using this in Equation (32), we have
d
dθ
³
ˆ W − W
?
´
= n
ρ
2
·µ
1 − γ
n − 1
n
1
1 − η
¶
(δ − η n
γ x
?)
1
η − (δ − η n
γ ˆ x)
1
η
¸
. (A.37)
With the speciﬁcations of the example, the condition for the eﬃcient allocation,
(21), becomes
ρ
2
θ (δ − η n
γ ˆ x)
1
η−1 n
γ = c , (A.38)
i.e.,
(δ − η n
γ ˆ x)
1
η =
µ
2c
ρθnγ
¶ 1
1−η
(A.39)
35The equilibrium condition (16) becomes
ρ
2
θ (δ − η n
γ x
?)
1
η−1
µ
1 − γ
n − 1
n
¶
n
γ = c , (A.40)
such that
(δ − η n
γ x
?)
1
η =
µ
2c
ρθnγ
¶ 1
1−η µ
1 − γ
n − 1
n
¶− 1
1−η
. (A.41)
Hence,
d
dθ
³
ˆ W − W
?
´
= n
ρ
2
µ
2c
ρθnγ
¶ 1
1−η


1 − γ n−1
n
1
1−η
¡
1 − γ n−1
n
¢ 1
1−η
− 1

 . (A.42)
A Taylor-series expansion-argument yields the result that the expression in brack-
ets is negative for η > 0, zero for η = 0 and positive for 0 < η < 1.
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